A prominent application of quantum cryptography is the distribution of cryptographic keys that are provably secure. Recently, such security proofs were extended by Vazirani and Vidick (Physical Review Letters, 113, 140501, 2014) to the device-independent (DI) scenario, where the users do not need to trust the integrity of the underlying quantum devices. The protocols analyzed by them and by subsequent authors all require a sequential execution of N multiplayer games, where N is the security parameter. In this work, we prove unconditional security of a protocol where all games are executed in parallel. Besides decreasing the number of timesteps necessary for key generation, this result reduces the security requirements for DI-QKD by allowing arbitrary information leakage of each user's inputs within his or her lab. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first parallel security proof for a fully device-independent QKD protocol. Our protocol tolerates a constant level of device imprecision and achieves a linear key rate.
Introduction
A = (A 1 , . . . , A N ) and B = (B 1 , . . . , B N ). The devices may be treated as black boxes which receive their input sequences X = (X 1 , . . . , X N ) and Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y N ) all at once and return output sequences A 1 , . . . , A N and B 1 , . . . , B N all at once (parallel repetition). In particular, we do not require the assumption that A i is independent of X i+1 . The only necessary assumption is that the inputs X 1 , . . . , X N are uniformly random conditioned on any information outside of Alice's lab, and the inputs Y 1 , . . . , Y N are uniformly random conditioned on any information outside of Bob's lab.
Broadening the model for device-independence allows for more flexible implementations of quantum key distribution -in particular, our result shows that before quantum key distribution takes place, arbitrary interaction can be allowed between each player's input sequence and his or her device. (Indeed, the input sequences can even be re-used from previous experiments, provided that they are completely unknown to the other player and the adversary when the protocol begins.) Our model also allows for any of the Bell experiments in the DI-QKD procedure to be performed simultaneously, which may open the door to faster implementations.
Our work addresses a general theoretical question: what are the minimal assumptions necessary to generate a uniformly random secret between two players? The main result shows that, if we can assume perfect private randomness and trusted classical computation for each player, then Bell nonlocality itself is enough to generate shared keys of arbitrary length.
The protocol and technical statements
All DI protocols use nonlocal games as building blocks. For our protocol, we use the Magic Square game. The Magic Square game has optimal quantum winning probability 1 and optimal classical winning probability 8/9.
Definition 1.1. The Magic Square game (MSG) is a two-player game in which the input alphabet for both players is
For our device model, we assume that Alice and Bob possess an untrusted two-part quantum device D = (D 1 , D 2 ). The device D 1 receives input from the set X N , where N is a positive integer, and gives an output in the set A N . The device D 2 receives input from the set Y N and yields output in the set B N .
Our parallel DI-QKD protocol, MagicQKD, is given in Figure 1 . Alice and Bob are the parties who wish to share a key, and Eve is an adversary. It is assumed that the untrusted devices (D 1 , D 2 ) are initially in a pure state with Eve's side information E (which is the worst-case scenario) and that Eve has access to any communications between Alice and Bob during the protocol. The security parameter N is the number of instances of Magic Square played. The parameter ǫ is a positive rational number. In our proof we show that there is some fixed positive value ǫ := ǫ 0 (not given explicitly) such that the protocol achieves a positive linear rate of key distribution as N tends to infinity.
Our security proof is based on the following assumptions for the protocol MagicQKD. 
Procedure:
1. Alice chooses X 1 , . . . , X N ∈ {1, 2, 3} uniformly at random, gives (X 1 , . . . , X N ) to D 1 as input, and records output (A 1 , . . . , A N ).
2. Bob chooses Y 1 , . . . , Y N ∈ {1, 2, 3} uniformly at random, gives (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) to D 2 as input, and records output (B 1 , . . . , B N ).
3. Alice chooses a random permutation F : {1, 2, . . . , N } → {1, 2, . . . , N } and broadcasts it to Bob. The players apply permutation F to {X i }, {Y i }, {A i }, {B i }.
4. Alice broadcasts (X 1 , . . . , X ǫN ) and Bob broadcasts (Y 1 , . . . , Y ǫN ).
5. For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ǫN }, Alice records the bit R j := (A j ) Y j (that is, the (Y j )th bit of A j ). For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ǫN }, Bob records the bit S j := (B j ) X j .
6. Alice broadcasts (R 1 , . . . , R ǫ 2 N ) and Bob broadcasts (S 1 , . . . , S ǫ 2 N ).
7. If the average score at the Magic Square game on games 1, . . . , ǫ 2 N is below 1 − ǫ, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the protocol succeeds, and Alice's raw key consists of the sequence (R 1 , . . . , R ǫN ) and Bob's raw key consists of the sequence (S 1 , . . . , S ǫN ). Let AliceKey denote the raw key R 1 , . . . , R ǫN possessed by Alice at the end of the protocol MagicQKD, let BobKey denote the raw key S 1 , . . . , S ǫN possessed by Bob, and let Eve denote all information possessed by Eve at the conclusion of the protocol (including her side information E and any information obtained by eavesdropping). Let Γ denote the final state of MagicQKD, and let SU CC denote the event that the protocol succeeds. Then, the smooth min-entropy H δ min (AliceKey | Eve, SU CC) measures the number of uniformly random bits that can be extracted from AliceKey in Eve's presence, while the smooth zero-entropy H δ 0 (AliceKey | BobKey, SU CC) measures the least number of bits that Alice needs to publicly reveal in order for Bob to perform information reconciliation and reconstruct AliceKey (see section 3 for details). Therefore, to show security for a quantum key distribution protocol, it suffices to show that the difference between the former quantity and the latter quantity is lower bounded by Ω(N ), for some negligible error term δ := δ(N ).
Our main result is the following.
There exists a constant ǫ := ǫ 0 > 0 and functions δ := δ(N ) ∈ 2 −Ω(N ) and R(N ) ∈ Ω(N ) such that the following always holds for protocol MagicQKD: either
The proof of this theorem is given in Subsection 5.2. This theorem establishes both robustness and a linear rate for MagicQKD. (The data ǫ 0 , δ, R are are not given explicitly and are left for future work. ) We note that in the protocol we have assumed that all entanglement shared by the devices (D 1 , D 2 ) is shared before the protocol begins. Practically this may be difficult, since it may require a quantum memory size that grows with N . A model which requires less quantum memory is shown in Figure 2 , where the entanglement is periodically updated during step 1 of MagicQKD from an outside entanglement source. (The source and its channels are both untrusted, and the only assumption is that the communication is one-way.) Fortunately this case is also covered by our analysis: a device which behaves as in Figure 2 is equivalent to one in which all transmissions from the entanglement source are sent in advance, and are stored in the components D 1 and D 2 . This illustrates the generality of the parallel model.
If we measure time by the number of prepare-and-measure steps executed by the devices, then a speed-up over sequential DI-QKD occurs in Figure 2 if the devices are capable of winning multiple rounds of the Magic Square game at a single iteration. Quantifying how this speed-up affects the key rate (and also how it increases demands on the devices) is a topic for further research.
Security analysis and proof techniques
In order to achieve secure parallel DI-QKD, there are two challenges that must be met simultaneously. The first is that the parallel scenario opens up the possibility of correlated cheating strategies by the devices (with correlations going both "forward" and "backward" between rounds) and one must show a linear amount of entropy in the key bits despite such strategies. The second is that the linear rate of entropy in the raw key must not only be positive; it must be larger than the amount of entropy that is lost during information reconciliation.
To meet these challenges we made two specific choices in MagicQKD, which differentiate our protocol from protocols for sequential DI-QKD. The first is that we use the Magic Square game, which has special properties for parallel DI-QKD (discussed below). The second is that the raw keys are only computed from a randomly chosen subset of the rounds. This allows us to decrease the amount of information that is revealed to Eve during the protocol, and is a necessary assumption for our security proof.
The central challenge when moving from the sequential setting to the parallel setting is the possibility of new correlations in the behavior of D 1 and D 2 on separate games. These correlations can have counter-intuitive properties: for example, Fortnow gave an example of a two-player game G such that w c (G 2 ) > w c (G) 2 , where w c denotes the optimal score for classical players and G 2 denotes the game G repeated twice in parallel (see Appendix A in [15] ). The same could not be true in the sequential setting -the optimal score for G repeated twice in sequence must be exactly w c (G) 2 . Thus the parallel assumption opens up new demands for cheating and requires new techniques.
A technique that has been highly successful for the parallel repetition problem is based on bounding the amount of information that players learn about one another's inputs when we condition on events that depend on a limited number of other games [24] . This technique was brought into the quantum context in [8, 16, 9, 4] , and allows the proofs of exponentially vanishing upper bounds for the quantum winning probability of G N for certain broad classes of games. A useful consequence of this technique, which is implicit in [8, 16, 9, 4] , is that for some games G the behavior of parallel players on a randomly chosen subset of rounds cannot be much better than the behavior of sequential players.
We apply this technique for parallel repetition to prove security for MagicQKD. Specifically, we show that the collision entropy H 2 (AliceKey | Eve) (which, as a well known fact, provides a lower bound on H ǫ min (AliceKey | Eve)) can be expressed in terms of the winning probability of the "doubled" version of the Magic Square game (MGuess) shown in Figure 5 . In this expanded game, players Alice, Bob, Alice ′ , and Bob ′ try to win the Magic Square game while also trying to guess one another's inputs and outputs. By the techniques of [8, 16, 9, 4] , the probability of winning this doubled game on ǫN randomly chosen rounds in an N -fold parallel repetition is not much more than the probability of winning ǫN instances of the games independently. This fact is the basis for our security claim.
We also make use of a technique from sequential device-independent quantum cryptography [21, 12] : each time players who are generating random numbers fail at a single instance of a game, we introduce additional artificial randomness to compensate for the failure (here represented by the register T in Figure 6 ). This artificial randomness (which is useful for induction) is used only for intermediate steps in the proof and is removed before the final security claim. This aspect of the proof is important for proving noise tolerance in MagicQKD.
We note that our proof makes use of all of the following properties of the Magic Square game: (1) it is perfectly winnable by a quantum strategy, (2) its input distribution is uniform, and (3) an optimal strategy yields perfectly correlated random bits between Alice and Bob. (As a consequence of (3), there is a positive rate of min-entropy in the raw key bits in MagicQKD, while the communication cost for information reconciliation tends to 0 when the noise tolerance is lowered, thus enabling a positive key rate.) The Magic Square game is the simplest game that we know of which satisfies all of these properties. A natural next step is to study which other games can be used for parallel DI-QKD.
After our result was publicized, Thomas Vidick [31] sketched an alternate proof of DI-QKD, using a strengthened parallel repetition result that appeared after our result [5] . Vidick's approach uses the class of "anchored" games introduced in 2015 [4] . With this approach one can replace Alice ′ and Bob ′ in MGuess with a single party, and a lower bound on H min (rather than H 2 ) follows via parallel repetition. The protocol in [31] is a version of our protocol which retains the crucial features discussed above. A comparison between the rates achieved by these two approaches is a topic for further research.
Organization. Section 2 establishes notation for our proofs. Section 3 provides the basis for our interpretation of collision entropy as the winning probability of a "doubled" game. Section 4 defines the doubled Magic Square game and proves an upper bound on its winning probability. Section 5 gives the proof of the central security claims. The appendix proves supporting propositions, including the parallel repetition result derived from [8, 16, 9, 4] .
Notation and Preliminaries
Some of the notation in this section is based on [27] . If T is a finite set, let Perm(T ) denote the set of permutations of T . If t ∈ T , then we write can T {t} to denote the complement of t, or if the set T is understood from the context, we simply write t for T {t}.
Let D(T ) denote the set of probability distributions on the finite set T , and let S(T ) denote the set of subnormalized probability distributions. If p, q ∈ S(T ) are subnormalized distributions let
where x := t∈T p(t) and y := t∈T q(t) respectively. The function ∆ is a metric on S(T ). If x 1 , . . . , x N and y 1 , . . . , y N are binary sequences, let Ham(x, y) denote the Hamming distance between x and y. The following lemma will be useful in a later proof. For any t ∈ [0, 1], let H(t) denote the Shannon entropy quantity: H(t) = −t log t − (1 − t) log(1 − t). 
Quantum states and operations
A quantum register (or simply register ) is a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space with a fixed orthonormal basis. We use Roman letters (e.g., B) to denote quantum registers. Given two quantum registers Q, Q ′ , we will sometimes write QQ ′ for the tensor product Q ⊗ Q ′ .
If S is a finite set, an S-valued quantum register is quantum register that has a fixed isomorphism with C S . If Q is a quantum register, let L(Q), H(Q), P(Q), S(Q), and D(Q), denote, respectively, the sets of linear, Hermitian, positive semidefinite, subnormalized positive semidefinite (trace ≤ 1) and normalized positive semidefinite operators on Q. A state of Q is an element of D(Q). Elements of S(Q) are referred to as subnormalized states of Q. A reflection is a Hermitian operator whose eigenvalues are contained in {−1, 1}.
For any quantum register Q, the symbol I Q denotes the identity operator on I, and U Q denotes the completely mixed state I Q /(dim(Q)).
If Q, Q ′ are quantum registers, the set L(Q) has a natural embedding into L(Q⊗Q ′ ) by tensoring with I Q ′ . We use this embedding implicitly:
Note that if Q is a Q-valued register and R is an R-valued register, then any function f : Q → R determines a process from Q to R via
We may denote this process by the same letter, f . A copy of a register Q is a register Q ′ with the same dimension with a fixed isomorphism
where the sum is taken over all standard basis elements e i . We then have Φ Q = Γ and
A measurement on a register Q is an indexed set {M i } i∈I ⊆ P(Q) which sums to the identity. A measurement strategy on Q is a collection of measurements on Q that all have the same index set.
We will use lower case Greek letters (e.g., γ) to denote complex vectors, and either uppercase Greek letters (e.g., Γ) or Roman letters to denote Hermitian operators on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. If Γ is a Hermitian operator on a tensor product space W ⊗V , then Γ V denotes the operator
Alternatively we may write Γ W for Tr W Γ. If T is a projector on W , let
and if Tr(
If R is a register whose values are real numbers, and ψ is a classical state of R, then E ψ [R] denotes the expected value of R. If µ is a probability distribution on a finite set Z, and f : Z → R is a function, then E z←µ [f (z)] denotes the expected value of f (z) under µ.
If Φ is a positive semidefinite operator, then Φ r denotes the operator that arises from applying the function
to the eigenvalues of Φ. We make free use of the following shorthands. If x 1 , . . . , x N is a sequence, then the boldface letter x denotes (x 1 , . . . , x N ). If X 1 , . . . , X N are quantum registers, then X denotes X 1 X 2 · · · X N . We write X i...j for the registers
Distance measures
For
The functions P (purified distance) and ∆ (generalized trace distance) are metrics on S(Q), and ∆ ≤ P ≤ √ 2∆. If Λ 1 and Λ 2 are both pure, then P = ∆. Both quantities P and ∆ satisfy data processing inequalities. (See Chapter 3 in [27] ).
Games
An n-player nonlocal game G with input alphabets X 1 , . . . , X n and output alphabets A 1 , . . . , A n is a probability distribution
together with a predicate
Such a game is free if p is a uniform distribution. Let G N denote the N -fold parallel repetition of G (i.e., the game with input alphabets (
A measurement strategy for a game G is a family {{M a|x } a } x of A-valued measurements, indexed by X , on a quantum register Q = Q 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Q n , where each measurement operator M a|x is given by
The Parallel Repetition Process (Par)
Parameters:
N : A positive integer G: An n-player game with input alphabet X = X 1 × . . . × X n and output alphabets A = A 1 × . . . × A n {M a|x } a,x : A measurement strategy for G N on an n-partite register C 1 · · · C n Φ: A state of C 1 . . . C n .
Registers:
Procedure:
. . , X n j ) at random according to the input distribution for game G.
3. For each i, apply the measurement {M a i |x i } a i to the system C i and record the result in the registers (A i 1 , . . . , A i N ).
4. Let W i = 1 if the ith game has been won, and let W i = 0 if the ith game has been lost.
5. Choose a permutation σ ∈ Perm{1, 2, . . . , N } uniformly at random. Apply the permutation σ to the registers {X j }, the registers {A j }, and the registers {W j }. where {M i a i |x i } a i is a measurement on Q i . It is helpful to describe a parallel repeated game as a process. In Figure 3 , we introduce the parallel repetition process Par(N, G, M, Φ) associated to a game G. The process Par includes a final step which shuffles the different instances of the game according to a randomly chosen permutation.
For any G, let w(G) denote the supremum quantum score of G (i.e., the supremum of P(W 1 = 1) in Par(1, G, M, Φ) taken over all initial states Φ ∈ D(C) and all measurements strategies M).
We will typically refer to states arising from processes as follows: the initial state will be denoted by Γ 0 , and Γ i will refer to the state that occurs after step i. The symbol Γ will denote the final state.
The following proposition asserts that if G is a free game, then the winning probability in a small number of rounds in Par is not much better than that which could be achieved by sequential players. This fact is implicit in the entropy approach to parallel repetition given in [8, 16, 9, 4 ].
Since we are not aware of a statement in the literature in the form that we will need, we have given a proof in Appendix C (see Theorem C.6). 
for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }.
For our purposes, it is crucial not only that the bound in (17) is an exponential function, but also that its base approaches w(G) as k/N approaches zero.
Entropy quantities
Definition 3.1. Let QR be a bipartite quantum register, and let Γ be a subnormalized state of QR. Then,
where Γ ′ varies over all subnormalized states of QR that are within distance δ from Γ under the purified distance metric P .
Note that we can equivalently let the minimization in (20) be taken only over the the states of QR that have trace no larger than Tr(Γ), since if Tr(Γ ′ ) were larger than Tr(Γ), then the scalar multiple [Tr(Γ)/Tr(Γ ′ )]Γ ′ would be at least as close to Γ as was the original state Γ ′ (see Lemma A.1).
Definition 3.2. For any subnormalized state Λ of a quantum register T , let
and let
Additionally, we define some entropy quantities for probability distributions.
Definition 3.3. If p is a probability distribution on a set S, let
If q is a subnormalized probability distribution on a set S × T , let
where q ′ varies over all subnormalized probability distributions on S × T such that ∆(q, q ′ ) ≤ δ.
Similar to the definition of smooth min-entropy, in (25), we can equivalently assume that the minimization is taken over distributions that are dominated by q (i.e., q ′ ≤ q). For all the entropy quantities specified so far in this subsection, we let
) If Γ is a classical-quantum state of a bipartite register ZQ, and B is a subset of the range Z of Z, then Γ B := Γ P B , where P : C Z → C Z denotes the projector onto the subspace spanned by B, and let Γ |B = Γ |P B . When the state is implicit from the context, we may write
to denote, respectively,
and we can use similar notation for the other conditional entropies defined above. Some of the applications of these quantities are as follows. Assume that Z is a classical register. The quantity H min (Z | Y ) (quantum conditional min-entropy) is a measure of the number of bits that can be extracted from Z in the presence of an adversary who possesses Y (see, e.g., [28] ). The quantity H(Z | Y ) (von Neumann entropy) measures the number of bits that can be extracted in the case in which multiple copies of the state ZY are available (see Chapter 11 in [23] ). The quantity H 2 (Z | Y ) is the conditional collision entropy. In the case where Y is a trivial register, the quantity H 2 (Z | Y ) is the negative logarithm of the probability that two independent samples of Z will agree. An interpretation of the case where Y is nontrivial will be explained in the next subsection.
If Z, Y are classical registers with a joint distribution q, then the quantity H 0 (Z | Y ) is a measure of the minimum number of bits needed to reconstruct the state Y from Z. This can be understood as follows: let M > H 0 (Z | Y ), and let R = {r : Z → (Z 2 ) M } be a 2-universal hash function family. 2 Suppose that Alice possesses Z = z and Bob possesses Y = y, and Alice chooses r ∈ R uniformly at random and reveals r and r(z) to Bob. Then, except with probability at most 2 M −H 0 (Z|Y ) , there will be only one value in the set {z | q(z, y) > 0} which maps to r(z) under r, and thus Bob can uniquely determine z.
Collision entropy and min-entropy are related by the following proposition (see subsection 6.4.1 in [27] ): Proposition 3.4. For any quantum registers RS, any normalized classical-quantum state Γ of RS, and any δ > 0,
3.1 An operational interpretation of collision entropy for measurements on a pure entangled state
If Γ is a classical-quantum state of a register ZY , then a common way to describe h 2 (Z | Y ) Γ is that it is the likelihood that an adversary who possesses Y can guess Z via the pretty good measurement {(
We present an alternative interpretation which is useful for measuring the randomness obtained from measurements on an entangled state. The following proposition refers to the process Guess shown in Figure 4 .
The Guessing Process (Guess)
Parameters:
Φ: A state of a register V {P j | j ∈ J } : A measurement on V
Registers:
V, V ′ : Registers with a fixed isomorphism V ∼ = V ′ J, J ′ : J -valued registers Procedure:
1. Prepare V V ′ in the canonical purification state of Φ.
2. Measure V with {P j } and store the result in J.
3. Measure V ′ with {P j } and store the result in J ′ . . Then,
Proof. The states Γ 2 JV ′ and Γ 3 JJ ′ are given by
and thus
as desired.
The Magic Square Guessing Game
In this section we consider the 6-player game described in Figure 5 . 
The output alphabet for Alice and Alice ′ B = {g 1 g 2 g 3 ∈ {0, 1} 3 | g i = 1}: The output alphabet for Bob and Bob ′ C = {0}: The output alphabet for Charlie and Charlie ′ Probability distribution:
Predicate:
The game is won if all three of the following conditions hold:
1. Alice and Bob's inputs match those of Alice ′ and Bob ′ .
2. Alice's key bit matches that of Alice ′ .
3. Either z = z ′ or Alice and Bob win the Magic Square game. In the game, Alice and Bob are attempting to win the Magic Square game, while Alice ′ and Bob ′ are simultaneously attempting to guess Alice's input, Bob's input, and Alice's key bit. However, a failure by Alice and Bob at winning the Magic Square game is forgiven if it happens that Charlie and Charlie ′ have the same output. (This last rule has the effect of making the game easier to win. It underlies the robustness property of our security proof for MagicQKD.) It is obvious that w(MGuess) ≤ 1/9, since the probability that Alice's and Bob's inputs match those of Alice ′ and Bob ′ is 1/9. We will prove that in fact w(MGuess) is less than 1/9 minus a positive constant. This will be crucial for establishing a nonzero key rate for MagicQKD.
The proof of the next proposition is given in the appendix. Roughly speaking, the proposition holds because rigidity for the Magic Square game [32] implies that any near-optimal strategy by Alice and Bob involves Alice and Bob performing approximate Pauli measurements on two approximate EPR pairs shared between them. The outcomes of such measurements are not guessable by an outside party (even with entanglement). Therefore it is impossible for Alice and Bob to achieve a near-perfect score at the Magic Square game while at the same time allowing Alice ′ to guess Alice's outcomes. Figure 5 . Then,
Proposition 4.1. Let MGuess denote the game in
Proof. See Appendix B.
Security Proof
In the current section we give the proof of Theorem 1.2. Our approach can be roughly understood as follows: our upper bound on the winning probability of MGuess implies, using parallel repetition, that the collision entropy of Alice's and Bob's inputs X 
An Intermediate Protocol
In order to show that Alice's raw key in MagicQKD is sufficiently random, we begin by analyzing the entropy produced by the related protocol MagicKey in Figure 6 . In MagicKey, we use an idea from our previous work on randomness expansion [21, 22] : when Alice and Bob fail to win the Magic Square game, we compensate by artificially introducing randomness. In [12] , this artificial randomness is represented by additional registers that have some prescribed entropy, and we adopt the same style here (by including the registers T 1 , . . . , T N ). We use these auxilliary registers to establish a lower bound on collision entropy, and the registers will subsequently be dropped. We begin with the following proposition, which addresses the amount of collision entropy that is collectively contained in Alice's and Bob's inputs, Alice's key register, and the auxiliary registers T i . 
Note that in the above statement, we are conditioning not only on the register E but also on the permutation register F .
Proof. We prove this result via an application of Proposition 3.5. Upon an appropriate unitary embedding, we may also assume E = C ′ D ′ , where C ′ , D ′ are copies of C, D, and that Φ is the canonical purification of Φ CD . Suppose that the process Par(N, MGuess, M, Φ) is executed with the measurement strategy 3
For any m-subset Z of {1, 2, . . . , N }, the probability that i∈Z W i = 1 after step 4 in the process Par(N, MGuess, M, Φ) is the same as the value of
after step 6 in MagicKey. The average of the former quantity over all (ǫN )-subsets is equal to the value of P(W 1 ∧ W 2 ∧ · · · ∧ W ǫN ) at the conclusion of Par(N, MGuess, M, Φ), while the average of the latter quantity is equal to the expression on the lefthand side of (36). The desired result follows from Theorem 2.2.
Next we deduce an upper bound on smooth min-entropy, focusing just on the registers R 1...ǫN T 1...ǫN . For compatibility with later derivations, we will take the error parameter to be 2 exp(−ǫ 4 N ).
Corollary 5.2. The following inequality holds:
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, we have
By Proposition 4.1, log[1/w(MGuess)] > log(1/9), and this bound can be simplified to
When we condition on the registers X 1...ǫN Y 1...ǫ , whose support has size 9 ǫN = 2 N ǫ log 9 , we obtain the bound (39).
In the next subsection, we will address conditioning on the event SU CC. For the time being it is helpful to condition on a related event. For any δ > 0, let W IN (δ) denote the event that the bit strings R 1...ǫN and S 1...ǫN differ in at most δ(ǫN ) places. (That is, W IN (δ) denotes the event that the proportion of wins among the first ǫN rounds is at least 1 − δ.) Consider the event W IN (2ǫ). We have
We assert that a lower bound in the same form holds when the registers T 1...ǫN are omitted.
3 Here the tensor product respects the following ordering of the players: Alice, Bob, Charlie, Alice ′ , Bob ′ , Charlie ′ . Charlie and Charlie ′ have trivial output, and we treat them as simply performing a unary measurement on a onedimensional register.
The Magic Square Key Process (MagicKey)

Parameters:
ǫ : A rational number from (0, 1/2] N : A positive integer such that N ǫ 2 is an integer {P a|x ⊗ Q b|y }: A measurement strategy for MagicSquare N on a bipartite system CD Φ: A pure state of a tripartite system CDE.
Registers:
C 1. Prepare CD in state Φ.
2. Choose x and y independently and uniformly at random from {1, 2, 3} N , and set X := x and Y := y.
3. Measure C with {P a x } a and store the result in register A.
4. Measure D with {Q b y } b and store the result in register B.
5. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, set R i to be equal to the (Y i )th bit of A i , and set S i to be equal to the (X i )th bit of B i .
6. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, if R i = S i , then set T i to be a independent coin flip. Otherwise, set T i to 0.
7. Choose a random permutation σ ∈ Perm{1, 2, . . . , N } and apply it to the registers 
Proof. The distribution of the registers T 1...ǫN under the subnormalized state Γ W IN (2ǫ) is supported only on binary strings of Hamming weight less than 2ǫ 2 N . Thus, by Proposition 2.1, these registers are supported on a set of size less than or equal to 2 H(2ǫ)ǫN . Therefore we can drop the registers T 1...ǫN from the lefthand side of (40) and and deduct H(2ǫ)ǫN from its righthand side, and the inequality is preserved. Since the term H(2ǫ)ǫN is dominated by Ω(ǫ)N , it may be ignored and the desired result follows.
Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
We now turn our attention toward the protocol MagicQKD (Figure 1 ). We will prove that MagicQKD generates a positive key rate. Our final statement will use the registers
The registers Eve denote the information possessed by Eve at the conclusion of MagicQKD. We begin by translating Corollary 5.3 into a statement about the success event for MagicQKD. Let SU CC denote the event that MagicQKD succeeds, and let SU CC ′ denote the event that MagicQKD succeeds and the event W IN (2ǫ) occurs.
Lemma 5.4. The events SU CC ′ and SU CC satisfy
Proof. We assume P(¬W IN (2ǫ)) > 0 (since otherwise the desired assertion is obvious). We have
We consider the second factor in (47). Let W i denote the indicator variable for the event that the ith game is won. After conditioning on ¬W IN (2ǫ), the only way that SU CC can occur is if the average of the variables W 1 , . . . , W ǫ 2 N exceeds that of W 1 . . . , W ǫN by at least ǫ. By ( [14] , Theorem 1 and Section 6), if an ǫ 2 N -subset S is chosen at random from a set of Boolean values T of size ǫN , then the probability that the average of S will exceed that of T by more than ǫ is at most e −2ǫ 2 (ǫ 2 N ) . This yields the desired bound.
As a consequence of Lemma 5.4, we have ∆(Γ SU CC , Γ SU CC ′ ) ≤ 2 exp(−2ǫ 4 N ), and therefore P (Γ SU CC , Γ SU CC ′ ) ≤ 4 exp(−2ǫ 4 N ) = 2 exp(−ǫ 4 N ). Since SU CC ′ =⇒ W IN (2ǫ), Γ SU CC ′ also satisfies inequality (41) from Corollary 5.3. We therefore have by the triangle inequality that the state Γ SU CC satisfies
Conditioning also on the registers R 1...ǫ 2 N S 1...ǫ 2 N decreases the quantity on the lefthand side of (48) by at most 2ǫ 2 N ≤ o(ǫ)N , and thus we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.5. The state Γ SU CC at the conclusion of MagicQKD satisfies
Meanwhile, by definition, the registers AliceKey and BobKey in the state Γ SU CC ′ differ in at most 2ǫ 2 N places, and thus by Proposition 2.1, we have
Applying Lemma 5.4 yields the following.
Proposition 5.6. The state Γ SU CC at the conclusion of MagicQKD satisfies
We can now prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let
If P(SU CC) ≥ δ, then, by Propositions A.3 and A.4 in the appendix,
where in lines (55)-(56), we used the fact that the terms δ 3 /2 and δ 2 are at least as large as the respective error terms in Propositions 5.5 and 5.6. We now simply fix ǫ := ǫ 0 > 0 to be sufficiently small that the function denoted by Ω(ǫ) in (57) is positive, and the proof is complete.
A Supporting Proofs for Entropy Measures
The following two lemmas bound the amount that the purified distance P (σ, λ) can increase under scalar multiplication of the two states σ, λ. We address a case where the scalar multiplication makes the trace of the two states equal, and also a case where scalar multiplication normalizes the larger of the two states.
Lemma A.1. Let Q be a quantum register, let λ, σ ∈ S(Q), and let r = Tr(λ), s = Tr(σ). Suppose that s ≥ r > 0. Then,
Proof. Let Λ, Σ be the normalizations of λ, σ. Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we have the following.
Inequality (58) follows.
Lemma A.2. Under the assumptions of Lemma A.1, the following inequality also holds.
Proof. Note that the quantity
is linear in c. We have
Now we use Lemma A.2 to address how smooth min-entropy behaves under normalization.
Proposition A.3. Let σ ∈ S(QR) be a nonzero state, let Σ be its normalization, and let δ > 0. Then,
Proof. Let s = Tr(σ). Find a state σ ′ satisfying satisfying Tr(σ ′ ) ≤ s and P (σ ′ , σ) ≤ δ 2 s/2 such that
(See the discussion following Definition 3.1.) The conditional min-entropy of σ ′ /s is then given by the expression on the righthand side of (66), and by Lemma A.2,
Inequality (66) follows.
The next proposition similarly addresses how H δ 0 behaves under normalization. Proposition A.4. Let q be a nonzero subnormalized probability distribution on S × T , where S, T are finite sets, and let s be the norm of q. Let δ > 0. Then,
Proof. This is immediate from the linearity of the distance function ∆.
B Proof of Proposition 4.1
Our proof builds off of steps from the proof of rigidity for the Magic Square game [32] . We will reproduce the fact that any near-optimal strategy for the Magic Square must involve approximately anti-commuting measurements, and use that fact to deduce inequality (35). Let {F a x }, {G b y }, {F ′ a x } be the measurements used by Alice, Bob, and Alice ′ , respectively, which we will assume (without loss of generality) to be projective, and let Φ denote their shared state, which we will assume to be pure: Φ = φφ * . For i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let F ij denote the reflection operator
define F ′ ij similarly in terms of {F ′ a x }, and let
Note that F ij and F ik always commute and F i1 F i2 F i3 = I, that G ij and G kj always commute and G 1j G 2j G 3j = −I, and similar relationships hold for F ′ ij . Let
and
Note that
and also
Thus,
and to complete the proof it suffices to find a general lower bound for max {ǫ, δ/2}. Note that for any i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
By similar reasoning,
We exploit the approximate anti-commutativity relations for {F ij } which are proven in [32] . We have the following.
By the concavity of the square root function, this yields
We also have the following, in which we make use of the approximate compatibility of the measurements {F ij } and the measurements {F ′ ij }.
Combining (89) via the triangle inequality with (85) (and using the fact that (F 22 F 11 ⊗ I)φ is a unit vector) yields
By symmetry, we likewise have the following for any i, j, i ′ , j ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} with i = i ′ , j = j ′ :
Averaging all such inequalities and exploiting the concavity of the square root function, we obtain
which implies
From (93), we can compute a lower bound on max{ǫ, δ/2}. If ǫ ≤ δ/2, then,
which yields
while if ǫ ≥ δ/2, similar reasoning yields
Therefore,
Substituting this value into (80), we find
(98)
C Randomly chosen rounds in parallel repetition of a free game
In this appendix, we prove that in a parallel repetition of a free game, the performance of the players on a small number of randomly chosen rounds is not much better than their performance would have been in a sequential scenario. Our proof is a rearrangement of elements from [8, 16, 9, 4] . For any state ρ of a bipartite system QR, the mutual information between Q and R and is given by
Let S(ρ σ) = Tr[ρ log ρ]−Tr[ρ log σ] denote the relative entropy function. The following relationship holds:
Also, the relative entropy function is related to the purified distance as follows: if α, β are density operators, then
(This follows from, e.g., Lemma 5 in [17] .) Throughout this section, we assume that a free game G = (X , A, p, L), with w(G) > 0, has been fixed. (Thus we avoid any need to note the influence of G on error terms.)
C.1 Preliminaries
Our first result asserts (roughly) that if a state γ of a bipartite system T Q is dominated by a small scalar multiple of a state that is uniform on T , then H(T | Q) γ must be close to log |T |.
Lemma C.1. Let γ be a classical-quantum state of a bipartite system T Q such that
where λ denotes a real number. Then,
It is obvious that the quantity H(T ) γ is at least log |T | − log(1/λ) since the eigenvalues of γ T do not exceed λ/ |T |. Thus we need only prove that
We can write
Note that the quantity
is equal to S(U T γ T ), which is nonnegative, and therefore
We therefore have the following, using the fact that the logarithm function is operator monotone:
= log(1/λ),
By definition, if two pure bipartite states ψ, φ ∈ D(Q ⊗ R) are such that P (ψ Q , φ Q ) = δ, then there is a unitary automorphism of R which maps φ to a state that is within ∆-distance δ from ψ. The next lemma asserts that if these bipartite states have some additional structure, then we can find such a unitary automorphism that is similarly structured.
Lemma C.2. Suppose that S, S ′ , Q, R are registers, where S is a copy of S ′ , and that ψ, φ are pure states on SS ′ QR that are supported on Span{e ⊗ e} ⊗ Q ⊗ R, where e varies over the standard basis elements of S, S ′ . Let δ = P (ψ SQ , φ SQ ). Then, there exists an S ′ -controlled unitary operator U on
where e, f, g vary over the standard basis elements of S, Q, R, respectively. The fidelity F (ψ SQ , φ SQ ) is then given by the expression
where M e = [m e f g ] f g and N e = [n e f g ] f g denote linear operators from R to Q. Find unitary operators U e : R → R such that
Then, the controlled operator e ee * ⊗ U e on S ′ ⊗ R satisfies the desired condition.
Now we prove a proposition about states that approximate the behavior of players in a free nonlocal game. (The statement of this proposition is based in particular on the statement of Lemma 4.3 in [9] .) Proposition C.3. Let X, X ′ denote X -valued registers, let A denote an A-valued register, and let Q = Q 1 Q 2 · · · Q n denote a n-partite register. Let ψ be a pure state of XX ′ QA given by ψ = uu * ,
where µ is a probability distribution on X and each u x is a unit vector in QA, and suppose that
for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then,
Proof. Case 1: Assume that δ = 0. Then, the state of X k (XX ′ QA) k is uniform on X k . Making use of Lemma C.2, we can find
The expected score E ψ [L(X, A)] can be achieved at the game G by having the n-players share some state of the form u x u * x with x ∈ X , receiving an input sequence y 1 . . . y n ∈ X , each applying the unitary U k x k →y k to their subsystem, and then measuring A k to determine their output. This is a valid quantum strategy, and so E ψ [L(X, A)] cannot exceed w(G).
Case 2: General case. Note that
or equivalently,
Therefore
Also, since
, and therefore the distribution of µ is within purified distance O( √ δ) from a uniform distribution. Thus,
We will reduce to Case 1 via the use of a "decoupling" procedure. 
Using inequality (124) and Lemma C.2, apply an X ′ k -controlled unitary operator V k to the register (X ′ Y Y ′ AQ) k to bring the registers Player 1...n to a state that is within purified distance O( √ δ) from state Ψ.
Denote this process (which takes place on the registers Player k ) by the symbol U k . The state
At the same time -since the registers X k Player k are not used in step 2 -we have H(X k | Player k ) = log |X | under the state U k (Ψ). Applying the data processing inequality and the triangle inequality, the state
is within ∆-distance O( √ δ) from Ψ, and it also satisfies
for all k. The desired result therefore follows from Case 1.
C.2 The Pure Parallel Repetition Process
We study the parallel repetition process given in Figure 7 (PureParallel). This PureParallel process is similar to the process Par in Figure 3 , except that it assumes the strategy used by the players involves a pure state and projective measurements, and that they obtain their input symbols from a maximally entangled state. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, let Player i t denote the registers of which player i has knowledge at the conclusion of step (t + 4):
Then, following our convention, Player i t denotes the registers of which players 1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n have knowledge at conclusion of step (t + 4):
The next proposition asserts that, if the probability of winning the first t rounds is not too unlikely, then these players possess only a limited amount of information about player i's input on the (t + 1)st round. The lower bound that we choose for the winning probability in the first t rounds can be somewhat arbitrary; we will take it to be w(G) 2t .
Proposition C.4. Suppose that P(W 1...t = 1) ≥ w(G) 2t in PureParallel. Then, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the state Γ t+4 that occurs after step t + 4 satisfies H(X 
Proof. Note that in the state Γ t+4 , the registers X i are uniformly distributed relative to X i X ′ i A i C i P . Since the conditional state Γ 
we have by Lemma C.1 that
The registers X i 1...t A i 1...t have a range of size 2 O(t) , and so when we additionally condition on them we obtain 
By permutation symmetry, the value of every term in the summation in (134) is the same. 4 Therefore,
We will use the previous proposition to prove by induction an upper bound on the probability that 
when x 1...t , a 1...t , σ vary according to the distribution given by the state Γ t+4 |W 1...t =1 , is lower bounded by log X i − O(t/N ). Additionally, the state of the registers Player 1...n t when conditioned on any such values X 1...t = x 1...t , A 1...t = a 1...t , P = σ, is a pure state. By Proposition C.3 and the concavity of the square root function, the probability of the players winning the (t + 1)st game under the distribution Γ t+4 |W IN (t) is no more than w(G) + O( t/N ), as desired. 4 The permutation symmetry argument can be made explicit as follows. Let p 
holds for a given value of t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}. If P(W 1...t = 1) < (w(G)) 2t , then
and there is nothing to prove. If P(W 1...t = 1) ≥ (w(G)) 2t , then by Proposition C.5,
which completes the proof.
The Pure Parallel Repetition Process (PureParallel)
Participants: Players 1, . . . , n and a referee.
Parameters:
N : A positive integer G: An n-player free game with input alphabet X and output alphabet A Φ ∈ D(C 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ C n ): A pure n-partite state {M a|x = M 1 a 1 |x 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ M n a n |x n } a,x : A projective measurement strategy for G N (where M i a i |x i ∈ P(C i )).
Registers:
{A i k }: Quantum registers (where A i k is A i -valued, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ N ) {X i k }, {X ′ i k }: Quantum registers (where X i k , X ′ i k are X i -valued, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ N ) {W k }: Bit registers (1 ≤ k ≤ N ) P : A Perm({1, 2, . . . , N })-valued register.
1. Players 1, 2, . . . , N collectively prepare the register C in the state Φ.
2. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, the ith player prepares the registers {X i k } k and {X ′ i k } k so that X i k X ′ i k is in a Bell state for all k.
3. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, the ith player applies the process from X i C i to X i C i A i given by the unitary map
4. The referee chooses a random permutation σ : {1, 2, . . . , N } → {1, 2, . . . , N }, stores it in P and broadcasts it to the players. Each player applies the permutation σ to their registers X i 1 , . . . , X i N , the registers X ′ i 1 , . . . , X ′ i N , and the registers A i 1 , . . . , A i N . 
For each
